

2(4) on the use of force or the threat of the use of force in international politics.

In the end, no such endorsement was obtained and so the attack went ahead without Security Council approval. The main military activities were over in a few weeks. Had the conflict dragged on, then domestic opponents of the three leaders (especially in the US and UK) would have used the alleged illegality of the attack as some of the grounds for their removal from office. (There remains a continuing controversy over whether Saddam Hussein really did have weapons of mass destruction).

It remains to be seen what will be the long-term implications of this action. For example, will the precedent thus created now give the opportunity for India to attack Pakistan (or vice versa) on the grounds that the country has weapons of mass destruction? Will the Arab states use it as an excuse to attack Israel (which does have weapons of mass destruction)? Will the United States use it as the basis of attacks on North Korea and Iran (and other alleged 'rogue states')? Will it contribute to the continued erosion of the UN Security Council's authority in handling threats to international peace and security?

On the other hand, given the progress made in international criminal law, will the three leaders in their retirement share with Chile's Augusto Pinochet and the US's Henry Kissinger the need to be careful which countries they visit for fear of being indicted as 'war criminals'?

To conclude, this article has shown how the 'just war' concept no longer figures in international law. It has shown how international law has moved along a separate path. But while this has avoided some of the problems inherent in the just war concept, it has encountered other ones.

## Hiroshima and the Pacifism/Just War Debate

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Hiroshima<sup>1</sup> has different meanings for different people. For some it has become a symbol of pacifism while for others it is an example of just war. That fact was driven home to me in 1995 by the controversy occasioned by the *Enola Gay* exhibit of the United States National Air and Space Museum, a division of the Smithsonian Institution. The exhibit displayed the *Enola Gay*, the plane that dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima. War veterans in particular reacted very strongly against the fact that the exhibit sought to present the ethical perspective not only of the side that dropped the bomb but also that of those on whom it was dropped. The exhibit, which could potentially be interpreted as presenting the dropping of the atom bomb as an act of mass murder, became the subject of intense criticism. The resultant controversy led to the exhibit being reduced and the director of the museum being pressured into resignation.

In the perception of history of many Americans (not only war veterans), the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima was a 'necessary evil'—a necessity brought about by Japanese military aggression. This would implicitly place the dropping of the atom bomb within the rationale of the just war theory.

In Japan, on the other hand, the reduction of the exhibit provoked a different kind of criticism—the criticism that the failure to communicate sufficiently the enormity of the tragedy of Hiroshima had led to an ongoing lack of interest and understanding. This led to an awareness of the need to inform people more thoroughly of the condition of the victims of the bombs. Given the enormous difference

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1. Atom bombs were dropped on both Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In this paper, I refer to Hiroshima as symbol of the nuclear tragedy. There is no intention of underestimating the tragedy of the Nagasaki bomb.

between the respective perceptions of Hiroshima of the United States and Japan, however, this awareness had minimal practical effect.

These opposing views of Hiroshima, one seeing it as a symbol of just war, the other as an anti-war symbol, do seem to set the just war theory and pacifism in opposition to one another. My purpose in this paper, however, is to illustrate the specific values of pacifism and at the same time to argue that the just war theory and pacifism are not the polar opposites that they might seem. Just war theory has had a substantial influence not only in Christian history but also in contemporary international society. To discuss the relevance of pacifism to just war theory, I will focus on Christian pacifism and the pacifism that has emerged in Japan since the war and is symbolized in Hiroshima.

## 1. Christian pacifism

### 1.1 *The History of pacifism*

From the origins of Christianity and throughout the era of persecutions, the basic stance of believers was pacifism. Until the edict of Milan (313) there are hardly any instances of Christians going to war or becoming professional soldiers. This may be attributable to the expectations of an early eschaton or to the fact that serving in the Roman army would involve emperor worship. But it would seem to be even more directly attributable to the fact that there was a common understanding that involvement in fighting was contrary to the teaching of Jesus.<sup>2</sup>

Such an understanding would certainly seem consistent with such words of Christ as 'Do not resist the evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also' (Mt 5:39) or 'Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you' (Mt 5:44). It seems likely that such expressions would have had a considerable influence on people. Surely, too, the following words of Paul, which reflect the teaching of Jesus, would have given direction to early Christians: "Bless those who persecute you; . . . Do not repay anyone evil for evil, but take thought for what is noble in the sight of all . . . Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave room for the wrath of God." (Rm 12:14-19)

2. For a discussion of early Christian pacifism, see Lisa Sowle Cahill, *Love Your Enemies: Discipleship, Pacifism, and Just War Theory* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 15-54.

After Christianity was recognized by the Roman Empire at the time of the reign of Constantine, Christianity had to restructure itself in relationship to the state. Specifically, with the growing awareness of the responsibility to defend the Empire against attacks from external enemies, just war thinking began to emerge in Christianity through the writings of such thinkers as Ambrose and Augustine. As a consequence, in the post-Constantinian Christian world, pacifist thought moved from the mainstream to a side-current in Christian tradition where it was kept alive by such groups as the Waldensians, the Cathars, the Hussites, the Mennonites, the Hutterites, the Quakers, etc. These, however, have remained small groups subject to frequent and severe persecutions. From the time of Constantine, pacifism has never for a moment constituted the dominant stance of Christianity.

### 1.2 *Contemporary pacifism*

Smallness in number does not always mean smallness in influence. The pacifist way of thinking has continued to this day and has been the spiritual source for some epoch making events. One may note such examples as Mahatma Gandhi who was influenced by the pacifism of both Tolstoy and the New Testament, particularly the Sermon on the Mount, and who, in turn, influenced Martin Luther King who also developed a movement of non-violent resistance.<sup>3</sup>

In Japan, Uchimura Kanzou (1861-1930), provides an example of pacifism. He did not begin as a pacifist. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War, he accepted the war as being in the cause of right and supported it. He saw this war in relation to what he saw as a historical mission for Japan in the world—to bring the advanced civilization of the West to Asia and thereby to enlighten the Orient. He also espoused the view that Christianity could complement and support the modernization policies of the Meiji Government. However, when Uchimura saw the Japanese colonial policy that followed the war, his perception of the war itself changed. He came to see it as the expression of an expansionist imperialistic policy whose goal was simply the spread of its own sphere of influence. He came to view the war as having been far from righteous, as in fact a war of invasion. This led him to a different perception of all war. Willingly influenced

3. For a discussion of the relationship of King's ideas to Gandhi in regard to non-violence, see Darrell J Fasching and Dell deChant, *Comparative Religious Ethics: Narrative Approach* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 116-133, 211-225.

by the New Testament and by the thought of the Quakers, he began to define himself as a 'denier of war'.<sup>4</sup>

In his subsequent thought, Uchimura set Christianity and armed force, or Christianity and the armed state, in sharp contrast: 'An armed Christian country? Such a monstrosity should not exist. A country that is armed is not a Christian country. Arms are for robbers.'<sup>5</sup> In the following passage, in which he criticizes the rational grounding of the just war theory, he argues against the idea that war can be 'the lesser evil' or that it can be a means to peace: 'If there are people who argue that war can be a lesser evil and that there are greater evils in this world than war, then I believe that those people do not know what they are saying. What evil is greater than war? . . . Good ends cannot be achieved through evil means . . . Peace will never come from war. Peace comes from the abolition of war.'<sup>6</sup>

Clearly, for Uchimura, as for many others, there lies a tension between the just war theory and pacifism that cannot easily be resolved.

### 1.3 *Pacifism in contemporary theology*

To consider contemporary pacifist theology, I will take up the thought of John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas. Pacifist thought is frequently divided into pragmatic approaches and confessional approaches. Both Yoder and Hauerwas deny the pragmatic stance and explicitly adopt a confessional one. In other words, they are not simply adopting pacifism or non-violence as a more effective means to achieve a particular end in a particular conflict. Rather, they argue that regardless of the consequences, the faith commitment to follow Christ requires pacifism. That is shown clearly in the following words of Yoder: 'Christian pacifism . . . is one in which the calculating link between our obedience and ultimate efficacy has been broken.'<sup>7</sup> Given that understanding, the denial of violence means that Christians ought not to become involved in violence even if the result is that many are killed. But this does not mean that pacifists become impartial observers of the reality that faces them.

4. See his discussion 'How I became a pacifist', in Uchimura Kanzo. *Hisenron* (Pacifism). (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990).

5. Uchimura, *Hisenron*, 63.

6. Uchimura, *Hisenron*, 63-64.

7. John Howard Yoder. *The Politics of Jesus*. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972, 246.

It is clear in the assertions of Yoder that pacifism is definitely not merely an internal decision on the part of believers but rather leads to social implementation. In his view, Christian pacifism and social ethics are intimately related—an outlook that clearly demonstrates Yoder's understanding of Jesus. Yoder argues both that it is evident from scripture that for Christ social ethics had a particular importance and that Jesus is not only relevant but even normative for contemporary social ethics.<sup>8</sup> From that standpoint, he takes up and clarifies the problems that are hidden behind questions that are frequently thrust at pacifists—such as 'What would you do if someone you loved was being attacked?'—and by answering these, he argues that for the person who seeks to follow Jesus, pacifism remains an urgent and pressing issue.<sup>9</sup> While analyzing the various responses that can be made to the question 'What would you do if . . .?', he elucidates the oversimplification that the question entails and discusses the possibility of unexpected solutions that may come from natural or supernatural sources.

Hauerwas shares this position with Yoder. Hauerwas adopts the view that all Christian ethics are social ethics. He also argues that the Christian understanding of peace is different from the usual understanding. He argues this in the following way: The reason that the Church has adopted such words as 'justice' and 'peace' is because it considers that even if people do not understand such statements as 'Jesus is Lord,' they will understand these words. The Church could never understand the true meaning of these words without reference to Jesus of Nazareth. After all, it was precisely to preserve peace and justice (in the Roman manner) that Pilate permitted the execution of Jesus.<sup>10</sup> The Christian understanding of peace is clearly one that does not permit the sacrificing of some for the sake of public order.

These words of Hauerwas provide a standpoint for critiquing the situation that has arisen in the United States in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. In face of instances where, in the mood that swept the country, some sought to use churches as a venue for arousing patriotism, Hauerwas makes the following response:

8. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 23.

9. John Howard Yoder. *What Would You Do? A Serious Answer to a Standard Question* (Scottsdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1983).

10. Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon. *Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), 38.

We want to support those who would rather die than murder. If you take Hiroshima and Nagasaki—if you call the World Trade Center terrorism, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were terrorist acts. And I've had people say, 'Well, that was war.' And I say, 'Well, you murder in war, too.'<sup>11</sup>

Such thinking, grounded in pacifism, seems to be the viewpoint of a definite minority in the United States. But precisely because it is a minority, those who argue that 'if you call the World Trade Center terrorism, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were terrorist acts' can be said to have opened up an important perspective. In the post-war period in the United States, there have been people who, in the framework of the just war theory, understand the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a justified act of war.<sup>12</sup> It is certainly not easy to look critically at the kind of nationalist sense of justice that is the premise of that understanding. To make it possible, according to Hauerwas, there is no alternative to following Jesus in the achievement of national justice. As an inevitable result, Hauerwas tries to distinguish between himself as an American and himself as a Christian. And he emphasizes that American justice and Christian justice are not the same thing—indeed *ought* not to be the same thing: 'The ethic of Jesus thus appears to be either utterly impractical or utterly burdensome unless it is set within its proper context—an eschatological, messianic community which knows something the world does not and structures its life accordingly.'<sup>13</sup> (Uchimura also linked anti-war thought and eschatological peace. He believed that world peace would come with the second coming of Christ.<sup>14</sup>)

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11. From *Sojourners* home page (July 2003). [http://www.sojo.net/news/index.cfm/action/display\\_archives/mode/current\\_opinion/article/CO\\_010702h.html](http://www.sojo.net/news/index.cfm/action/display_archives/mode/current_opinion/article/CO_010702h.html)
12. Attitudes in America towards the use of the atom bomb have shown some variation and diversification with the passage of time. For a discussion of attitudes at the time of the bombing in 1945, see Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations*. (3<sup>rd</sup> edition, New York: Basic Books, 2000), 263–268.
13. Hauerwas and Willimon, *Resident Aliens*, 90.
14. Uchimura. *Hisenron*, 313-314.

## 2. The understanding of war in Japan

While many in the United States have come to disapprove of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the following quotation from Robert J. Lifton suggests that approval of and even forgetfulness of the atom bombs is widespread not only among the general populace but among theologians and religious leaders as well:

But about four decades later a survey of post-Hiroshima theology found that the atomic bombings had been surprisingly ignored by theologians . . . There have of course been periodic condemnations of Hiroshima and of subsequent nuclear buildup from various religious sources, but generally as ethical rather than theological statements. Mainstream American religious leaders, moreover, have more often accepted the Hiroshima bomb than condemned it.<sup>15</sup>

I will turn now to Japanese society which has not been greatly influenced by Christianity either before the war or after. It will become clear that attitudes towards war provide a glimpse into profound dimensions of both pre-Hiroshima and post-Hiroshima Japan.

### 2.1 Before Hiroshima—the era of the greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere

The justification for the United States dropping the bomb was to prevent the expansion of Japanese militarism. Japanese militarism at the time had its own perceptions and its own rationale for self-justification. For Japan at the time, extending Japanese hegemony into East Asia was seen as a sacred goal, the formation of a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' In the way of thinking promoted by Japanese militarists, in order to eradicate the old world contaminated by Western civilization and bring about a new world order centered on the Japanese spirit, the 'Divine Country' of Japanese history was placed on a par with the 'Kingdom of God' of Western Europe. The understanding of the emperor as a God-in-human-form was used to counter the monotheistic understanding of the deity of the West. It was modeled on that, so that the understanding of the Divine Nation that

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15. Robert J Lifton and Greg Mitchell. *Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial* (New York: GP Putnam's Sons, 1995). 346.

sustained National Shinto was in fact moving towards something along the line of the Christian 'Kingdom of God'.

## 2.2 After Hiroshima

The bitter experience of the bomb in Hiroshima and the risk of global war between the United States and the Soviet Union that followed brought that way of thinking to an abrupt end and led to a post-war pacifism in Japan that has focused on the nuclear threat. The image of war as a final apocalyptic war (such as a nuclear war) has held so much sway that issues that ought to be considered in relation to non-nuclear regional wars have necessarily been eliminated from the anti-nuclear peace movement. In effect, this has meant that the just war theory has hardly been considered at all. Further, since the peace movement set apocalyptic nuclear war as its basic focus, after the dissolution of the cold war structure, and with it the increasing remoteness of the nuclear threat, discussion of peace itself also lost a lot of steam.<sup>16</sup>

## 3. Beyond the dualism of Pacifism and the Just War theory

### 3.1 The characteristics of Japanese pacifism

Pacifism is considered a basic premise of the Constitution of Japan drawn up after the war. The preamble of the constitution includes the following:

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16. This description of post-war pacifism in Japan is not intended to imply that no undercurrents from pre-war Japan remain. Parallels between pre-war militarism and the sarin gas attack on the underground railway in Tokyo (1995) by Aum Shinriky have been drawn by Lifton, who interviewed former members of the sect: 'For it's guru-centered example, Aum had in some sense to look no further than state-manipulated Shinto' — Robert J Lifton. *Destroying the World to Save it: Aum Shinriky, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), 244. Further, Aum 'did re-create much of the psychology with which Japan pursued its imperial war' (*ibid*, 249). Further, he points out that the principle of cloning (the idea that Aum Shinriky believers ought to be clones of the guru Asahara) is morally equivalent to the belief that military personnel were not merely vassals of the emperor but his children. The fact that Aum Shinriky resembles the 'Divine Nation' thinking of the past demonstrates to us that it is not the product of some kind of mutant era, but a reflection of a deep undercurrent in Japanese society of the twentieth century.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in the peace, free from fear and want.

Using the terms of John Galtung's definitions of violence and peace, the pacifism of the Japanese constitution is oriented towards not just a negative peace (the absence of personal violence) but includes positive peace (the absence of structural violence) in its field of vision. Taking the view that peace cannot be achieved merely by getting rid of personal violence Galtung expands the concept of violence in the following way: 'violence is present when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations'.<sup>17</sup> He described this violence as structural violence.

In the terms of this definition, then, the pacifism that is set as an ideal in the Japanese constitution is to be understood as oriented towards this positive peace that aims at overcoming structural violence. That is because 'tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance' and 'fear and want' are precisely what is meant by 'structural violence'.

A further characteristic of the post-war Japanese pacifist movement is that it is an 'experiential pacifism' grounded in the national experience of tragedy symbolized by Hiroshima. In other words, it is not a 'conceptual pacifism' derived from philosophical reasoning, but an experiential pacifism that is grounded in a history of concrete suffering and that sees all war as illegal and criminal.

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17. Johan Galtung. Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research* Vol 6, No 3, 1969: 168.

### 3.2 Structural violence and positive peace

This experiential pacifism, seeking to overcome structural violence, has important similarities to Christian pacifism. Christian pacifism is premised on the experience of severe persecutions in its history. Further, as a result of recent scholarly research regarding Jesus, the image that had been widely held of Jesus as a supernatural apocalyptic prophet has begun to give way, and interest is being shown in the image of Jesus as a teacher of wisdom who showed the way to a transformation of this world.<sup>18</sup> Further, from the 1960s on, as is represented in the thought of liberation theology and of such theologians as Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg and many others, a focus on working for social transformation has become an important dimension of Christian faith and theology. This focus has become an important dimension of Christian pacifism, as can be seen, for example, in the thought of Yoder and Hauerwas, whom I touched on earlier and for whom pacifism is intimately linked to a practical social ethic.

Accordingly, to connect all this with the discussion so far, Christian pacifism is not to stop at a negative peace that seeks the elimination of personal violence, but rather must shift its emphasis to positive peace that seeks to overcome structural violence.

This brings us back to the important question of the relation to just war theory. This is because a pacifism that concerns itself only with the elimination of personal violence (physical, armed violence) can only stand in antinomy to the just war theory, whereas a pacifism that seeks also to overcome hidden structural violence has the possibility of being in a relation of complementarity to just war thinking. Just war thinking can assist pacifism in taking due consideration of the complexity of policy judgments, while pacifism can maintain a critical distance from the idea of just war so as to promote humanitarian considerations.

By classifying wars as either just or unjust, just war theory has the effect of legitimating some wars while at the same time trying to place some controls on them. To achieve this purpose, just war theory has generally been divided into two sets of principles, namely, principles dealing with the justification of going to war (*jus ad bellum*) and principles for the conduct of war (*jus in bello*). The former set of principles takes up the question of under what circumstances it would

18. See, for example, John Dominic Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography* (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1994).

be justifiable to go to war, the latter with conditions that pertain to the conduct of war.

These sets of principles are not simple to apply. Michael Walzer, for example, has spoken of their complexity particularly in relation to humanitarian interventions.<sup>19</sup> There is, in fact, a certain lack of clarity associated with each of the criteria listed in these principles—both for *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. However, it would seem that in spite of these limitations, when all these criteria are brought together, they must have a more restraining effect than having no principles at all.

Nevertheless, there is the risk of just war theory being used to justify war all too easily. To avoid this, not only must its criteria be evaluated rigorously, but it must be used in conjunction with other approaches such as the pacifist approach of overcoming structural violence. The principles for going to war of just war theory are at risk of being so oriented towards legitimizing a conflict that its application can amount to little more than confirmation of a decision that has in fact already been made after a fairly cursory consideration of the situation. However, if the structural factors that give rise to violence can be identified and analyzed from a pacifist point of view, then it should be possible to take a more critical and long-range view of situations. In sum, a pacifism that fails to provide a useful analysis of situations is likely to be decried as a form of escapism, while an approach to just war theory that ignores the challenge of pacifism is likely to become a political tool for justifying wars. It should be possible, however, for just war theory and pacifism to stand in mutual complementarity.

In any case, we cannot deal with the realities that preceded and that follow Hiroshima merely by repetitively continuing a debate about an either/or choice between the just war theory and pacifism. We should not get bogged down in either/or choices but rather look at both pacifism and just war theory in relation to the contexts in which they operate. Pacifism has relevance even if it remains the standpoint of a small minority. Precisely because they are a minority, pacifists have the freedom to take a critical stance toward political authority. When those who profess pacifism become part of the majority group in such a way that they bear responsibility for the whole polity, their former critical spirit is likely to become dulled. This is essentially the change that took place in the post-Constantinian church. On the other

19. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*.

hand, just war theory is designed precisely for political authority, but when a government begins to suppress dissent or to see itself as absolute or as sacred, then just war theory is likely to lose its effectiveness as a restraint on warfare. In cases such as this, the critical stance of pacifism has a role.

The current situation in Japan is that the principle of pacifism is faltering as a result of the issue of deploying the Self-Defense Force for the reconstruction of Iraq. This issue is complicated by the fact that doubts have arisen about the existence of the weapons of mass destruction that provided a basis for beginning the Iraq War. It was precisely because there were supposed to be weapons of mass destruction that war as a last resort was undertaken. If the weapons of mass destruction do not exist, an important criterion for the conditions for just war (*jus ad bellum*) would be lacking.

What is clear is that the either-or question of going to war or not going to war is not the only issue. This world is so replete with unreasonableness and suffering that the simple fact of not fighting a war will not solve anything. The issue is how to be in solidarity with the oppressed and the persecuted, how to share in their risks, and how to seek out the path to reconciliation. This must be taken up as a matter of justice.

## Epilogue: On Putting Just War Theory in its Place, an Anglican Perspective on Human Rights

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*This paper was originally given as an address to the Forum meeting on 2 March 2003 in St Marks Episcopal Cathedral, Seattle, USA. The address was given the week after mass demonstrations against the war and thus before the invasion of Iraq had taken place. Through the cathedral facilities it was also addressed to Episcopalians in the USA. The article has since been written up and slightly expanded. I did not think and do not think that the invasion of Iraq could be described as a measure of last resort. Dr Blix made a very well informed and reasonable plea for more time. However, my main point was not so much to evaluate whether the invasion could be adjudged in terms of the just war theory, but rather to suggest that the just war theory itself was not enough because it assumes certain things which do not pertain and in any case other things should be included in the concerns of Christians besides war or not war.*

Just war theory was developed over many years and it has had a variety of formulations. It was most extensively developed by Thomas Aquinas in order to try to put down some Christianly inspired principles to temper and moderate the conduct of wars.

Just war theory appeared recently in the media in relation to the invasion of Iraq by the so called 'coalition of the willing', led by the United States of America. It appeared regularly on the pages of the New York Times and in Time Magazine. It was also deployed in the Australian media. The impression given by these treatments is that when you tick through the points in just war theory in relation to the statements of our governments then the proposed invasion of Iraq could be declared to be a just war, or not according to your judgement as to how the various criteria apply in the particular circumstances.